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Imagine that law enforcement officials pull you over as part of a 
routine traffic safety inspection and discover marijuana in the bed of 
your truck.  Police officers place you under arrest, and the State 
charges you with felony marijuana trafficking, as well as several mis-
demeanors.  Upon your arraignment, the court assigns an overbur-
dened public defender to handle your case.  Although you believe 
you are innocent of all charges, the State offers you a favorable plea 
deal that will limit your sentence exposure and ensure that your crim-
inal record remains free of any felony convictions.  Your attorney ad-
vises you to accept the plea deal, assuring you that by pleading guilty, 
you will be released from prison after just a few months’ time, allow-
ing you to return to your family and get on with your life.  Rather 
than risk a lengthy trial and appeals process, you accept the plea deal, 
serve your time, and return to your family. 
Now imagine that several years have passed, and life has returned 
to normal.  That is, until a United States Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement official knocks on your door.  Although you have lived 
in the United States for decades, have raised U.S.-citizen children, 
and have served as a productive member of American society, the 
immigration official informs you that you are being deported back to 
your home country.  Shocked and confused, you appear before an 
immigration judge, who informs you that by pleading guilty to those 
misdemeanors several years back, you placed yourself under the ju-
risdiction of the Board of Immigrations.  You plead with the judge; 
your job, your family, your entire life is here in the United States.  
Had you known the conviction would render you deportable, you 
would have gone to trial and vigorously contested your guilt, rather 
than accepting a guilty plea for a crime you did not commit.  Alt-
hough the judge sympathizes with your plight, he tells you that there 
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is nothing he can do.  The minute you pled guilty, your fate was 
sealed. 
This scenario is all too familiar to Jose Padilla, who pled guilty to 
several misdemeanor drug charges in 2001, after his court-appointed 
attorney told him he “did not have to worry” about his plea affecting 
his immigration status.  Fortunately, through a series of direct appeals 
and post-conviction proceedings, Padilla was able to challenge his 
conviction all the way up to the Supreme Court of the United States. 
In 2010, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in Pa-
dilla’s case, holding that defense attorneys have an affirmative obliga-
tion to advise noncitizens about the deportation consequences of a 
guilty plea.1  The Court’s holding in Padilla overruled decades of low-
er court precedent regarding noncitizens’ Sixth Amendment rights.  
The new rule announced in Padilla seems to have “mark[ed] a major 
upheaval in Sixth Amendment law,”2 which stands to profoundly im-
pact the overlap between immigration and constitutional criminal 
procedure. 
In recent years, Congress has significantly restricted its immigra-
tion laws and has steadily expanded the category of offenses that may 
render a noncitizen deportable.  Indeed, an increasing number of of-
fenses will now render noncitizens “automatically deportable” 
through expedited procedures intended to ensure that the deporta-
tion occurs as soon as the alien is released from prison after serving 
the sentence imposed for an underlying conviction.  Now, more than 
ever, noncitizens need attorneys who will effectively explain these is-
sues to them when discussing the implications of their strategic 
choices during criminal proceedings.  Unfortunately, many attorneys 
have not kept up with the changing immigration laws, and many 
noncitizens now face deportation as a result of their counsel’s ineffec-
tive guidance. 
Thus, for many noncitizen detainees, the Padilla decision could 
not have come at a better time.  The Padilla decision has paved the 
way for an influx of habeas corpus petitions filed by individuals seek-
ing to vacate their convictions based on Padilla’s Sixth Amendment 
standard.  However, since this decision came down relatively recently, 
the vast majority of habeas petitions based on Padilla’s holding have 
sought to apply the Padilla standard retroactively to convictions that 
became final before the Supreme Court decided Padilla. 
 
 1 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). 
 2 Id. at 1491 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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Unfortunately for habeas petitioners post-Padilla, the prevailing 
federal retroactivity doctrine has effectively barred retroactive appli-
cation of the vast majority of new rules announced by the Supreme 
Court.  In Teague v. Lane,3 the Supreme Court announced that new 
rules of criminal procedure would not apply retroactively on collat-
eral review unless the rule fell under one of two narrow exceptions.4 
The first Teague exception permits retroactive application of new 
procedural rules that place “certain kinds of primary, private individ-
ual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority 
to proscribe.”5  The second Teague exception applies to “watershed 
rules of criminal procedure”6—ones that are necessary to prevent an 
impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction, and “alter our 
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the 
fairness of a proceeding.”7  The Supreme Court has emphasized the 
tremendously limited scope of Teague’s watershed exception, and has 
stated that “it is clearly meant to apply only to a small core of rules 
requiring observance of those procedures that . . . are implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.”8  As the Court has remarked, it is “unlike-
ly that many such components of basic due process have yet to 
emerge,” and to this date, the Supreme Court has yet to find a new 
rule that falls within the second Teague exception.9 
Lower courts remain divided on the issue of Padilla’s retroactivity, 
and in the past year, federal courts have struggled to define the scope 
of Padilla and its application to habeas petitioners.  For the most part, 
federal courts applying the Teague analysis to Padilla have struggled 
with the threshold issue of whether Padilla’s central holding laid 
down a “new rule of criminal procedure,” or merely reinterpreted the 
existing Sixth Amendment standard as applied to plea proceedings.  
Some courts have applied Padilla’s principles retroactively on the 
grounds that Padilla did not forge a new rule, but merely applied the 
Strickland analysis to a new circumstance.10  Other courts have denied 
 
 3 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 4 Id. at 310 (plurality opinion). 
 5 Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 6 Id. 
 7 Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418 (2007) (quoting Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 665 
(2001)). 
 8 Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 (2004) (quoting O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 
157 (1997)). 
 9 Beard, 542 U.S. at 417 (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993)). 
 10 See, e.g., United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 639–40 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding Padilla was 
not a new rule because it only extended counsel’s obligation to advise the defendant of 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea). 
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retroactivity, finding that Padilla did, in fact, announce a new rule of 
criminal procedure that would not apply to petitioners whose convic-
tions became final before Padilla was decided.11 
After a year of debate on this issue, the Supreme Court will set out 
to answer the question of Padilla’s retroactivity this fall when it de-
cides Chaidez v. United States.12  In August 2011, the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals denied relief on a habeas petitioner’s Padilla-based 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, concluding that Padilla an-
nounced a new rule of criminal procedure that did not apply to the 
petitioner’s conviction, which became final before Padilla was an-
nounced.13  The Seventh Circuit’s decision created a circuit split on 
the issue, which is now ripe for Supreme Court review.  The Supreme 
Court’s forthcoming decision in Chaidez will settle once and for all 
whether Padilla created a “new rule” that is subject to further Teague 
analysis.  However, because neither party in Chaidez has raised any 
question regarding the applicability of Teague’s exceptions,14 this issue 
will very likely remain an open question.15 
Although the Supreme Court is unlikely to rule on this question, 
many lower federal courts considering Padilla’s retroactivity have con-
fronted the Teague exceptions head-on.  These lower courts have all 
determined that Padilla’s rule does not fall within either of Teague’s 
two narrow exceptions.16  However, in light of the forthcoming deci-
sion in Chaidez, this question warrants a closer look.  In the certiorari 
 
 11 See, e.g., United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 2011) (ruling that 
Padilla announced a new rule that does not apply retroactively because it does not fall 
within either of the Teague exceptions); Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 694 (7th 
Cir. 2011), cert granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3608 (U.S. Apr. 30, 2012) (No. 11-820) (holding that 
Padilla announced a new rule which does not apply retroactively). 
 12 Chaidez v. United States, 80 U.S.L.W. 3608 (Apr. 30, 2012) (No. 11-820). 
 13 Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 694. 
 14 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Chaidez v. United States, No. 11-820 (U.S. Dec. 23, 
2011) (“[S]ave exceptions not relevant here, a rule of criminal procedure that ‘breaks 
new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government’ will 
not be given retroactive effect on collateral review.” (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 
288, 301 (1989))). 
 15 There are, however, two petitions for certiorari pending before the Supreme Court that 
directly address the applicability of the second Teague exception to Padilla.  See Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari, Figureo-Sanchez v. United States, No. 12-164 (U.S. July 27, 2012), 
81 U.S.L.W. 3092; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Mathur v. United States, No. 12-439 
(U.S. Oct. 9, 2012), 2012 WL 4842975.  Should the Court avoid answering this more di-
rect question in Chaidez, it could choose to grant certiorari in either of these cases to de-
cide the issue once and for all. 
 16 See, e.g., Chang Hong, 671 F.3d at 1159 (finding that Padilla “is not within either of the ex-
tremely narrow Teague exceptions to the retroactivity bar”); Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 686 
(holding that “Padilla announced a new rule that does not fall within either of Teague’s 
exceptions . . .”). 
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documents filed in the Supreme Court, the parties in Chaidez argued 
that the question of Padilla’s retroactivity was one of “exceptional im-
portance” which “go[es] to the core of the legitimacy of criminal 
convictions.”17  Amicus briefs in support of Chaidez’s petition for cer-
tiorari argued that Padilla’s scope is central to the “proper and fair 
functioning of our justice system,”18 indicating that many, if not most 
immigrants, when properly advised by counsel, would choose to vig-
orously defend themselves before a jury rather than face the automat-
ic immigration consequences of a guilty plea.19  The parties’ acknowl-
edgements in Chaidez show just how important Padilla’s principles are 
to the fairness of a criminal proceeding.  Given the exceptional im-
portance of Padilla’s principles, there is room to argue that, should 
the Court find that Padilla announced a new rule, Padilla should fall 
under the second Teague exception for bedrock rules of criminal 
procedure. 
The scholarly literature regarding Padilla’s scope likewise supports 
this conclusion.  Many scholars have hinted that Padilla’s decision will 
have an immensely profound impact on Sixth Amendment jurispru-
dence, and could one day even be interpreted as a “deportation Gide-
on,” which would guarantee a right to legal counsel in deportation 
hearings.  One scholar has even remarked that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Padilla marked a “watershed” in the Court’s approach to 
regulating plea proceedings.20  These scholarly arguments lend sup-
port to the idea that Padilla truly represented a “bedrock” rule of 
criminal procedure that should fall within Teague’s watershed excep-
tion. 
This Comment will discuss the doctrinal underpinnings of 
Teague’s retroactivity standard, and will analyze Teague’s application to 
Padilla-based claims, arguing that Padilla might fall under Teague’s 
watershed exception.  Part I summarizes the Court’s pre-Padilla Sixth 
Amendment precedent in the context of habeas petitioners’ ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claims.  Part II discusses the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Padilla and delineates the ways in which Padilla 
changed the existing Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.  Part III out-
 
 17 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 16. 
 18 Brief for Constitutional Accountability Center as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petition 
at 12, Chaidez, No. 11-820 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2012). 
 19 Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, National Immigration Project 
of the National Lawyers Guild, Immigrant Legal Resource Center and Immigrant Defense 
Project as Amici Curiae Supporting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Chaidez, No. 11-
820 (U.S. Jan. 30, 2012). 
 20 Stephanos Bibas, Regulating The Plea-Bargaining Market:  From Caveat Emptor To Consumer 
Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1118 (2011). 
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lines the Court’s retroactivity doctrine—highlighting Teague’s water-
shed exception—and includes a survey of the federal courts and the 
various approaches taken in applying the retroactivity doctrine to Pa-
dilla-based claims.  Finally, in Part IV, this Comment will discuss the 
immense impact that Padilla has, and will continue to have, on Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence and the crossover between immigration 
and constitutional criminal procedure.  This Comment will argue 
that Padilla announced a new rule of criminal procedure, but that the 
rule nonetheless deserves retroactive effect.  In light of Padilla’s po-
tential influence, this Comment will argue that the Court has finally 
encountered the first new rule that qualifies under Teague’s seemingly 
insurmountable watershed exception. 
I.  HABEAS CORPUS AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution requires the 
government to provide a right to legal redress against unlawful crim-
inal detention.21  This right, known as the Writ of Habeas Corpus, al-
lows a criminal convict to challenge his conviction in state or federal 
court, giving him the opportunity to advance arguments that call into 
question the lawfulness of his conviction and sentence.  In most in-
stances, a petitioner may only seek habeas relief once he has exhaust-
ed all of his opportunities for direct appeal.22 
In the two years since the Supreme Court decided Padilla, federal 
courts have received an influx of habeas corpus petitions filed on be-
half of noncitizens seeking to vacate or set aside their sentences based 
on the Sixth Amendment right recognized in Padilla.  Federal courts 
have jurisdiction to entertain a petition for federal habeas review un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which 
make up part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(“AEDPA”).  Section 2241 grants federal courts power to entertain an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by an individual held in 
custody in violation of the United States Constitution.23  Section 2254 
provides a federal remedy for state prisoners who are found to be in 
state custody in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United 
States.  Section 2255 serves as the federal counterpart to § 2254, per-
 
 21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 22  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (“An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it 
appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the 
State.”). 
 23 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006). 
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mitting a “prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established 
by Act of Congress [to] claim[] the right to be released upon the 
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States . . . or is otherwise subject to collat-
eral attack . . . .”24  Generally, habeas petitioners are subject to a one-
year statute of limitations, which runs from the date on which judg-
ment of conviction becomes final.25  However, if the Supreme Court 
recognizes a new constitutional right and permits lower courts to ap-
ply the new right retroactively, AEDPA grants petitioners one year to 
apply for habeas relief based on the new constitutional standard.26 
Criminal convicts may apply for habeas relief in a number of dif-
ferent circumstances.  However, convicts most commonly base their 
habeas petitions on Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel violations.  In 
the last few decades, the vast majority of these cases have centered on 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during trial or plea pro-
ceedings.27  Although the Sixth Amendment does not explicitly guar-
antee anything more than minimal legal representation in criminal 
proceedings, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amend-
ment to confer upon individuals the right to effective assistance of 
counsel throughout the course of a criminal prosecution.28  The Su-
preme Court had the opportunity to define the scope of this Sixth 
Amendment right in the landmark case Strickland v. Washington.  In 
Strickland, the defendant filed for a writ of habeas corpus following 
his murder conviction, claiming that his counsel had rendered inef-
fective assistance at his sentencing hearing by failing to investigate 
and present certain arguments to the sentencing judge.29  Upon re-
viewing the defendant’s claims, the Strickland Court delineated a two-
prong test for determining whether an ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim will prevail: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.  
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.  This requires showing that coun-
 
 24 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2006 & Supp. I 2008). 
 25 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1) (2006 & Supp. I 2008). 
 26 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (2006 & Supp. I 2008). 
 27 See, e.g., ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K. DALEY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW:  
CHALLENGING STATE COURT CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 14 (1995) (stating that ineffective as-
sistance of counsel was, by far, the most common claim asserted by state prisoners in ha-
beas petitions, and that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were found in 25% of 
all habeas petitions). 
 28 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 
 29 Id. at 675–76. 
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sel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a 
trial whose result is reliable.30 
With respect to the first prong of this test, the Court recognized 
the standard for attorney performance as that of reasonably effective 
assistance.31  Thus, in order to satisfy the first prong, a defendant 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that “counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”32  
The Court then expounded on the prejudice prong, requiring the 
defendant to show that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.”33 
Strickland involved a petitioner who alleged ineffective assistance 
of counsel during trial and at sentencing.  For a short time, it re-
mained an open question whether the Strickland standard would ap-
ply to ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from the plea 
process.  However, a year later, in Hill v. Lockhart, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the application of the two-prong Strickland test in the con-
text of a guilty plea, albeit slightly modifying the second Strickland 
prong.34  Thus, in addition to proving that his attorney’s performance 
was deficient, a petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel 
during plea proceedings “must show that there is a reasonable prob-
ability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”35 
Federal and state courts alike now unanimously agree that the 
Sixth Amendment requires an attorney to inform his client about the 
direct consequences—incarceration, fines, probation, etc.—of a 
guilty plea before entering the plea in court.  Thus, when a petitioner 
claims that his attorney did not inform him of the direct consequenc-
es of his guilty plea, courts promptly turn to the Strickland analysis.  
However, even after Strickland, many courts continued to assume that 
the Sixth Amendment did not require defense counsel to inform a 
client about a guilty plea’s collateral consequences.36  Furthermore, 
 
 30 Id. at 687. 
 31 Id. (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 
759, 770–71 (1970); Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151–52 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
 32 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
 33 Id. at 694. 
 34 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 59 (1985). 
 35 Id. at 58–59. 
 36 Collateral consequences are the additional civil penalties, generally mandated by statute, 
that attach to criminal convictions.  Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collat-
eral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Indi-
viduals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634 (2006).  Collateral consequences may include loss or re-
striction of professional license, loss of voting rights, ineligibility for public funding, 
registration requirements for criminal databases, etc.  Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. 
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until 2010, many state and federal courts included deportation within 
their definition of “collateral consequences.”  Accordingly, many 
courts did not require defense counsel to explain to their client the 
fact that a guilty plea could render them automatically deportable.37 
It was against this backdrop that the Supreme Court granted a writ 
of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Kentucky38 to decide whether, 
as a matter of federal law, petitioner Jose Padilla’s attorney had an 
obligation to advise his client that the offense to which he was plead-
ing guilty would result in automatic deportation.39  By granting certio-
rari, the Supreme Court paved the way for a “major upheaval in Sixth 
Amendment law.”40 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 
Jose Padilla had been a lawful permanent resident of the United 
States for over forty years when he was caught driving a truck carrying 
marijuana and drug paraphernalia.41  Padilla was subsequently indict-
ed for his offense.42  Upon advice from his court-appointed attorney, 
Padilla pled guilty to three misdemeanor drug-related charges.43  Alt-
hough the plea substantially reduced the amount of time that Padilla 
 
Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. 
REV. 697, 699–700 (2002). 
 37 See, e.g., Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 336 (5th Cir. 2008); Broomes v. 
Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251, 1256–57 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 
25 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6, 7 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 
768 (11th Cir. 1985) (federal courts applying the collateral consequences doctrine to ad-
vice regarding deportation consequences of a guilty plea).  See also Oyekoya v. State, 558 
So. 2d 990, 990–91 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Rosas, 904 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1995); Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Ky. 2005); State v. Mon-
talban, 810 So. 2d 1106, 1110 (La. 2002); Commonwealth v. Frometa, 555 A.2d 92, 93–94 
(Pa. 1989) (state courts applying the collateral consequences doctrine to advice regarding 
deportation consequences of a guilty plea).  In recent years, Congress has adopted and 
amended various provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act (“IIRIRA”), which identifies certain “aggravated felonies” which, if committed, 
will subject immigrants to automatic deportation, without giving them an opportunity for 
any meaningful form of judicial review.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43), 1228 (2006).  The 
“aggravated felony” category has steadily expanded over the years. 
 38 Padilla v. Kentucky, 555 U.S. 1169 (2009). 
 39 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010). 
 40 Id. at 1491 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 41 Id. at 1477 (Opinion of the Court). 
 42 Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008). 
 43 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478; Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483. 
676 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:2 
 
would spend in custody, his conviction rendered him automatically 
deportable under revised immigration laws.44 
Upon application for habeas relief, Padilla claimed that his attor-
ney had not only failed to advise him that his guilty plea would sub-
ject him to deportation proceedings,45 but had affirmatively told him 
that he “did not have to worry about immigration status since he had 
been in the country so long.”46  Padilla claimed that he relied on his 
counsel’s erroneous advice when he pleaded guilty to the drug 
charges, and alleged that he would have insisted on going to trial had 
he not received incorrect advice from his attorney.47 
Even assuming the truth of Padilla’s allegations, the Supreme 
Court of Kentucky denied Padilla’s motion without granting him an 
evidentiary hearing.  The court based its ruling on the ground that 
while the Sixth Amendment guaranteed accurate advice from counsel 
regarding the direct consequences of a guilty plea, it did not protect 
defendants from clearly erroneous advice regarding deportation be-
cause deportation was merely a “collateral consequence” of a convic-
tion.48  Applying the “collateral consequences” doctrine, the Kentucky 
Supreme Court concluded: 
As collateral consequences are outside the scope of the guarantee of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it follows that counsel’s failure to ad-
vise Appellee of such collateral issue[s] or his act of advising Appellee in-
correctly provides no basis for relief.  In neither instance is the matter 
required to be addressed by counsel, and so an attorney’s failure in that 
regard cannot constitute ineffectiveness entitling a criminal defendant to 
relief. . . . 49 
After his postconviction petition was denied by the Kentucky Su-
preme Court, Padilla petitioned for a writ of certiorari directly to the 
United States Supreme Court.50  Padilla’s petition for certiorari high-
lighted two important questions.  The first question was whether “the 
mandatory deportation associated with a plea to an ‘aggravated felo-
ny’ . . . can still be described as a ‘collateral consequence’ of a crimi-
nal conviction which relieves counsel from any affirmative duty to ad-
 
 44 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B), 1228 (2006) (defining “ag-
gravated felony” to include “trafficking in a controlled substance” and providing that al-
iens convicted of an “aggravated felony” may be deported without receiving any form of 
review by a federal court). 
 45 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
 46 Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483. 
 47 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485. 
 50 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651). 
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vise[.]”51  The second question was “whether an attorney’s ‘flagrant’ 
or ‘gross’ misadvice on a collateral matter, such as mandatory depor-
tation, can constitute grounds for setting aside the guilty plea.”52  On 
February 23, 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and set out 
to answer these two questions.53 
In a 7-2 decision, the Padilla Court rejected the Kentucky Su-
preme Court’s formalistic approach and held that the Sixth Amend-
ment requires defense counsel to inform noncitizen clients about 
immigration consequences before entering a guilty plea.54  The Court 
acknowledged the Kentucky Supreme Court’s avowal of the “collat-
eral consequences” doctrine, and recognized that Kentucky was not 
alone in adopting that view.55  Although the members of the Court 
equivocated on their own views of the collateral consequences doc-
trine, the majority made it very clear that the collateral versus direct 
distinction was ill-suited to evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims concerning the specific risk of deportation.56  As a matter of 
law, the Padilla Court removed deportation out of the civil, collateral 
consequence realm, and for the first time in Supreme Court history, 
applied the Strickland analysis to an attorney’s failure to advise his cli-
ent of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea.57  As the 
Court stated, “[t]he severity of deportation—‘the equivalent of ban-
ishment or exile, . . .’—only underscores how critical it is for counsel 
to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation.”58 
Padilla is now well-settled law going forward.  Criminal defense at-
torneys now have an affirmative obligation to inform their clients 
about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, and failure to 
do so may properly give rise to a claim for habeas relief.  However, as 
with all constitutional cases, the Padilla decision did not immediately 
alleviate the problems faced by the hundreds of noncitizens who, at 
the time, faced deportation after having received deficient infor-
mation at a plea proceeding.  Consequently, courts have been left 
with the burdensome task of determining the retroactivity of Padilla’s 
 
 51 Id. at 7. 
 52 Id. at 7–8. 
 53 Padilla v. Kentucky, 555 U.S. 1169 (2009). 
 54 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). 
 55 Id. at 1481. 
 56 Id. at 1481–82. 
 57 Id. at 1482. 
 58 Id. at 1486 (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947) (internal citation 
omitted)). 
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central holding.59  State and federal courts have split regarding the 
retroactive application of Padilla, and courts have spent countless 
hours considering these backward-looking Padilla claims.  As is the 
case with all habeas matters, determination of this issue could result 
in the reversal of many state and federal prisoners’ convictions.  More 
importantly, courts ruling on Padilla’s retroactivity stand to signifi-
cantly impact the number of noncitizens facing deportation as a con-
sequence of their conviction.  If Padilla were found to apply retroac-
tively, many current inmates who will face deportation after the 
conclusion of their prison sentence would have the opportunity to 
challenge their convictions due to the fact that their attorneys did not 
inform them that a guilty plea would result in automatic deportation.  
In this case, perhaps now more than ever, determination on the issue 
of retroactivity will have a significant impact on the scope of the Su-
preme Court’s ruling. 
III.  SURVEYING THE COURTS 
Since the Supreme Court decided Padilla in 2010, hundreds of pe-
titioners have filed for habeas relief, claiming ineffective assistance of 
counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment due to their attorneys’ 
failure to advise them of the immigration consequences of a guilty 
plea.  Given Padilla’s recent status, the overwhelming majority of the-
se petitioners seek retroactive application of Padilla’s central holding.  
Courts have adopted various approaches to handle these claims and, 
as a result, have come to very different conclusions regarding retroac-
tivity.  Many courts have refused to address the issue of retroactivity 
and have dismissed petitioners’ claims under a straightforward appli-
cation of Strickland’s ineffective assistance of counsel standard.  Other 
courts have instead chosen to tackle the issue of retroactivity head-on.  
Courts that have selected this approach have assumed different posi-
tions regarding Padilla’s status as a “new rule” or an “old rule.”  This 
judgment has proven to be outcome-determinative in each and every 
case considering Padilla’s retroactivity.  This Section will explore the 
various approaches that state and lower federal courts have adopted 
to handle the retroactivity of Padilla, and will explain the possible 
flaws in many of the lower courts’ arguments. 
 
 59 See Maria Baldini-Potermin, Padilla v. Kentucky One Year Later:  Courts Split over Interpreta-
tion and Application of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Constitutional Holdings, 88 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 1449, 1450–51 (June 13, 2011) (noting cases in which courts evaluated claims of 
ineffective assistance based on failure to inform about a guilty plea’s deportation conse-
quences). 
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A.  Courts Eschewing Padilla’s Retroactivity 
When called upon to determine the retroactivity of Padilla, many 
state and federal courts have assumed, for argument’s sake, that the 
Strickland analysis would apply to the given claim, and have then dis-
missed those Padilla-based claims under either the first or second 
prong of Strickland.  Take, for example, the Western District of Wash-
ington’s ruling in Torres v. United States60 in October 2011.  Petitioner 
Uriel Valdovinos Torres pled guilty to one charge of conspiracy to 
distribute a controlled substance and was sentenced to 120 months of 
incarceration on December 7, 2009, a few months before the Su-
preme Court decided Padilla.  Torres filed a § 2255 habeas petition 
based on his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 
because his attorney allegedly failed to inform him that his guilty plea 
would subject him to deportation,61 and that he would not qualify for 
cancellation of removal.62  Given that Torres’ conviction became final 
before the Supreme Court issued Padilla, Torres sought to retroac-
tively apply the rule announced in Padilla to his claim on collateral 
review.63  After briefly discussing the current controversy over Padilla’s 
retroactivity, the court decided that it need not resolve the issue of 
whether Padilla states a new rule or merely restates existing law, be-
cause even assuming Padilla did apply retroactively, Torres’ claim 
would not satisfy either of the Strickland prongs.64 
The Torres court first considered whether Torres’ attorney had 
fallen below “an objective standard of reasonableness.”65  The court 
found that “unlike the attorney in Padilla who told Padilla that he 
‘did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in 
the country so long,’ [Torres’ attorney had] told him that his crime 
was an aggravated felony” that could subject him to deportation, alt-
hough she did not tell him that a guilty plea would result in automat-
 
 60 No. C10-5896, 2011 WL 5025148 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 21, 2011). 
 61 Id. at *1. 
 62 In order to qualify for cancellation of removal, an alien must show that:  (1) he has been 
physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than ten years 
immediately preceding the date of such application; (2) he has been a person of good 
moral character during such period; (3) he has not been convicted of certain crimes; and 
(4) removal would result in exceptional and unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, par-
ent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence.  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2006). 
 63 Torres, 2011 WL 5025148, at *1-2. 
 64 Id. at *2. 
 65 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). 
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ic deportation.66  Despite the fact that Torres’ attorney did not paint a 
complete picture for Torres, the court lauded her for providing 
Torres with technically correct information, and concluded that her 
performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness under Strickland.67 
Although the court could have dismissed Torres’ claim based on 
Torres’ failure to satisfy the first Strickland prong, the court went on 
to consider Torres’ claim under Strickland’s prejudice prong.  Torres 
maintained that had he known that accepting a plea agreement 
meant foregoing his opportunity to pursue cancellation of removal 
from the United States, he would not have accepted the plea and 
would instead have gone to trial.68  However, the court rejected 
Torres’ claim, recognizing that Torres would not have been eligible 
for cancellation of removal even if he had gone to trial, because he 
had not been in the country long enough before being arrested.69  
Finding that Torres had failed to prove the requisite level of preju-
dice, the court dismissed Torres’ Padilla-based claim without address-
ing the issue of retroactivity.70 
 
 66 Torres, 2011 WL 5025148, at *5 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 
(2010)). 
 67 Id.  Accord United States v. Stubbs, No. 2:02-cr-61-FtM-29DNF, 2011 WL 3566839, at *5 
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 15, 2011); Obomighie v. United States, Civ. No. 11-746, Cr. No. 91-391, 
2011 WL 2938218, at *3 (D. Md.  July 18, 2011); Jae Myung Pak v. United States, Civ. No. 
10-1982, Cr. No. 92-49, 2011 WL 1298559, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2011); Sanchez-
Contreras v. United States, Nos. 10-CV-4008, 08-CR-4079, 2011 WL 939005, at *3 (N.D. 
Iowa Mar. 16, 2011); Gill v. United States, Nos. CV-10-3786, CR-07-1382, 2010 WL 
4916642, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2010)  (district court cases as of March 2012, assuming 
retroactivity, but dismissing claim on first Strickland prong). 
 68 Torres, 2011 WL 5025148, at *5. 
 69 Id. at *6. 
 70 Id.  Accord Robles v. Cate, No. CIV S-10-3398, 2011 WL 4710800, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 
2011); Quijada v. United States, Nos. 2:10-CV-403, 05-CR-171(6), 2011 WL 4687534, at *1 
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2011); Richards v. United States, Nos. 11 CV 1341, 09 CR 562, 2011 
WL 3875335, at *3, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2011); Infante v. United States, Nos. 8:11-CV-
1525-T-17TBM, 8:95-CR-288-T-17TBM, 2011 WL 3268426, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2011); 
Hill v. New York, No. 10-CV-0150, 2011 WL 2671506, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. July 8, 2011); Gon-
zalez v. United States, No. 5:11-cv-197-Oc-36DNF, 2011 WL 1811655, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 
12, 2011); Limones v. United States, Nos. 1:07-CR-356-5-TWT, 1:10-CV-2265-TWT, 2011 
WL 1157371, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2011); 1:10-CV-2265, 2011 WL 1157371, at *5 (N.D. 
Ga. Mar. 29, 2011); United States v. Aceves, Civ. No. 10-00738, Cr. No. 08-00501, 2011 WL 
976706, at *4 (D. Haw. Mar. 17, 2011); Banos v. United States, Nos. 10-23314 CIV, 98-
00015 CR, 2011 WL 835799, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2011); Smith v. United States, Nos. 
10-21507-Civ, 09-20952-Cr, 2011 WL 837747, at *9, *10–11 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2011); 
Gudiel-Soto v. United States, 761 F. Supp. 2d 234, 238–39 (D.N.J. 2011); Brown v. United 
States, No. 10 Civ. 3012, 2010 WL 5313546, at *4, *5, *6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2010); United 
States v. Gutierrez Martinez, Civ. No. 10-2553, Cr. No. 07-91(5), 2010 WL 5266490, at *2, 
*3 (D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2010); Falcon v. D.H.S., No. SACV 07-66, 2010 WL 5651187, at *10 
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2010); LaPorte v. Artus, No. 9:06-cv-1459, 2010 WL 4781475, at *2 
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In an exercise of caution, many courts have taken the route that 
the Torres court took, assuming for argument’s sake that Padilla ap-
plies retroactively, but dismissing the petitioner’s Strickland claim on 
the merits, either under the deficient performance prong, the preju-
dice prong, or, as in Torres, both prongs.  This trend illustrates the ex-
treme difficulty that petitioners will face when raising Padilla claims, 
even if the Supreme Court were to declare that Padilla applies retro-
actively.  By avoiding the issue of retroactivity, lower courts can re-
duce the number of cases that go up on appeal, and are thus able to 
moderate the “floodgates” fear that courts often face when deciding 
whether a case applies retroactively.  Courts tend to prefer this more 
passive approach.  Unfortunately, courts were only able to delay the 
issue of Padilla’s retroactivity for so long.  While courts have succeed-
ed in dismissing many claims on a straightforward Strickland analysis, 
there remain a large number of claims that would not fail under ei-
ther Strickland prong.  These cases have required courts to confront 
the issue of retroactivity head-on. 
B.  Courts Confronting Padilla’s Retroactivity 
Where courts have come across Padilla claims where counsel’s ef-
fectiveness clearly fails under both Strickland prongs, they have been 
forced to apply the Supreme Court’s somewhat muddled retroactivity 
doctrine to determine whether the petitioner can benefit from retro-
active application of the Sixth Amendment standard recognized in 
Padilla.  After briefly reviewing the history of the retroactivity doctrine 
in federal habeas proceedings, and laying out the standards that gov-
ern retroactivity of new constitutional rules, this Section will explain 
the two approaches adopted by federal courts addressing retrospec-
tive Padilla claims. 
1.  Retroactivity Doctrine in Federal Habeas Proceedings 
The Supreme Court has struggled with the retroactive application 
of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure for decades.  “Be-
fore 1965, the Supreme Court assumed that all of its decisions should 
 
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2010); Haddad v. United States, Civ. No. 07-12540, Cr. No. 97-80150, 
2010 WL 2884645, at *6 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2010); United States v. Millan, Nos. 
3:06cr458, 3:10cv165, 2010 WL 2557699, at *1 (N.D. Fla. May 24, 2010) (district court 
cases as of March 2012, assuming retroactivity, but dismissing claim on second Strickland 
prong). 
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apply retroactively.”71  However, when the Court started to selectively 
incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states in the 1960s, it began 
to recognize the harsh burden that a presumption of retroactivity 
would impose on state courts.72  To help alleviate this burden, the 
Court enunciated a three-part test to be applied to cases involving a 
question of retroactivity in Linkletter v. Walker.73  At issue in Linkletter 
was the retroactivity of the new exclusionary rule74 established in 
Mapp v. Ohio.75  In the Linkletter Court’s view, retroactivity was to be 
determined “by examining the purpose of the [new] rule, the reli-
ance of the States on prior law, and the effect on the administration 
of justice of a retroactive application of the [new] rule.”76  Applying 
this three-part test, the Court in Linkletter held that the exclusionary 
rule would not apply retroactively in collateral habeas proceedings.77 
For the next several years, courts applied the Linkletter test irre-
spective of whether the case came before the court on direct or col-
lateral review.  However, Linkletter was met with immense dissatisfac-
tion from jurists at every level,78 and by the late 1980s, the Supreme 
Court recognized the need for modifications to the Linkletter rule, es-
 
 71 Linda Meyer, “Nothing We Say Matters”:  Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 427 
(1994). 
 72 The process of selective incorporation led to some of the twentieth century’s most influ-
ential Supreme Court decisions, including Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding 
that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
must be excluded from criminal proceedings in state court), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment against states by holding that state 
court defendants have a right to counsel), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
(incorporating the Fifth Amendment against states and holding that suspects must be in-
formed of their right to an attorney and their right against self-incrimination prior to be-
ing questioned by authorities).  As a result of these decisions, the nation “move[d] from a 
state-based criminal justice system to a criminal justice system that ha[d] to conform with 
nationally imposed rules.”  See The Supreme Court:  A Nation of Liberties (PBS television 
broadcast Feb. 7, 2007), available at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/ 
about/pop_transcript3.html (discussing the impact of selective incorporation on the 
criminal justice system in an interview with Professor Joseph F. Kobylka).  Had these new 
rules of constitutional criminal procedure applied retroactively, state courts would have 
faced an overwhelming influx of direct and collateral challenges brought on behalf of 
state prisoners, seeking retroactive application of the new rules. 
 73 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965). 
 74 Id. at 621–22. 
 75 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
 76 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 302 (1989) (citing Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636–40). 
 77 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 639. 
 78 See, e.g., Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity:  A Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA. 
L. REV. 1557, 1557 n.3, 1558 (1975) (delineating the struggles that lower courts faced in 
applying the Linkletter test); James B. Haddad, “Retroactivity Should Be Rethought”:  A Call for 
the End of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 417, 419–20 
(1969) (discussing the positions of various Supreme Court justices regarding the Linkletter 
test). 
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pecially in the criminal context.79  In a series of dissenting opinions, 
Justice Harlan deeply criticized the Linkletter test and argued that the 
Court should retroactively apply new rules to all convictions that were 
not yet final at the time the new rule was announced.80  The Court 
adopted Harlan’s arguments in Griffith v. Kentucky,81 holding that 
“failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases 
pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adju-
dication.”82 
Inspired by Justice Harlan and the decision in Griffith, the Su-
preme Court finally embraced a distinction between cases on direct 
review and cases on collateral review, and established a more coher-
ent test for retroactivity in Teague v. Lane.83  In Teague, the petitioner, 
convicted of attempted murder and other offenses, filed a habeas pe-
tition seeking to receive the benefits of the new rule established in 
Taylor v. Louisiana,84 which held that the Sixth Amendment required 
jury venire to be drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.85  
The petitioner requested that this fair cross-section requirement be 
extended to the petit jury that convicted him.86  The Court, however, 
found that it was unnecessary to reach this question, because doing so 
would require the Court to apply the rule from Taylor retroactively.87  
The Court announced that “[r]etroactivity is properly treated as a 
threshold question,”88 and set out to “clarify how the question of ret-
roactivity should be resolved for cases on collateral review.”89  Justice 
O’Connor, writing for the plurality, expressed her belief that Linklet-
 
 79 See Teague, 489 U.S. at 303 (“Not surprisingly, commentators have ‘had a veritable field 
day’ with the Linkletter standard, with much of the discussion being ‘more than mildly 
negative.’”). 
 80 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 680–81 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (arguing that “[r]efusal to apply new constitutional rules to all 
cases arising on direct review” produces “unacceptable ancillary consequences”); Desist v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, I have conclud-
ed that Linkletter was right in insisting that all ‘new’ rules of constitutional law must, at a 
minimum, be applied to all those cases which are still subject to direct review by this 
Court at the time the ‘new’ decision is handed down.”). 
 81 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
 82 Id. at 322. 
 83 489 U.S. 288, 305, 310 (1989). 
 84 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
 85 Teague, 489 U.S. at 292. 
 86 Id. at 299. 
 87 Id. at 316 (“Because a decision extending the fair cross section requirement to the petit 
jury would not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review under the approach 
we adopt today, we do not address petitioner’s claim.”). 
 88 Id. at 300. 
 89 Id. 
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ter “require[d] modification,”90 and thus went on to establish a new 
test, which now universally governs the question of retroactivity. 
The Court first reaffirmed the implication from Linkletter that “old 
rules” would apply retroactively on both direct and collateral review.91  
Under Teague, a rule that is “‘merely an application of the principle 
that governed’” a prior Supreme Court case is an old rule that applies 
retroactively.92  On the other hand, a case that “breaks new ground or 
imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” is 
considered to have announced a “new rule” for purposes of deter-
mining retroactivity.93  In deciding whether a particular case qualifies 
as a “new rule,” courts must consider whether the result of the case 
was “dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s convic-
tion became final.”94 
Assuming that most cases announced new rules, the Court adopt-
ed Justice Harlan’s direct-collateral distinction and held that a new 
rule receives full retroactivity for cases on direct review.95  The Court 
held, on the other hand, that new rules should rarely apply retroac-
tively to cases on collateral review.  The Court established two narrow 
exceptions to the general presumption against retroactivity. 
First, the Court held that a new rule may apply retroactively if it 
placed “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond 
the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.”  Thus, 
new rules that are substantive, and not procedural, fall outside the 
Teague constraints.  The Court has expounded on this distinction by 
explaining that a rule is substantive when “it alters the range of con-
duct or the class of persons the law punishes.”96  If, however, a new 
rule regulates “the manner of determining the defendant’s culpabil-
ity,”97 it qualifies as a procedural rule that does not apply retroactively. 
Second, the Court carved out an exceedingly narrow exception 
for “watershed rules of criminal procedure”98 that implicate the “fun-
damental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”99  A new 
rule will only fall under Teague’s watershed exception if it satisfies two 
 
 90 Id. at 301. 
 91 Id. at 307. 
 92 Id. (quoting Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 216–17 (1988)). 
 93 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. 
 94 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 95 Id. at 304. 
 96 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004). 
 97 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 98 Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. 
 99 Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 
(1990)). 
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requirements:  (1) “Infringement of the rule must ‘seriously diminish 
the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction,’” and (2) “the 
rule must ‘alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural ele-
ments essential to the fairness of the proceeding.’”100  Despite strong 
criticism, Teague’s presumption against retroactivity on collateral re-
view remains in effect today.101 
Teague’s watershed exception is exceptionally rare.  Indeed, in the 
years following Teague, the Court has “yet to find a new rule that falls 
under the second Teague exception.”102  Since Teague was decided in 
1989, the Supreme Court has considered fourteen cases where the 
petitioner argued that a new rule is “watershed” in nature and in eve-
ry case the Court has refused to find the rule as such.103  As a guide to 
the type of rule that would receive watershed status, the Court has re-
peatedly identified the universal right to counsel in criminal proceed-
ings104 established in Gideon v. Wainwright.105  Nevertheless, the Court 
in Teague made sure to highlight the rarity of such a landmark case, 
and stated that it was “unlikely that many such components of basic 
due process have yet to emerge.”106 
The Teague precedent has come under fire in the last few decades, 
in part due to the extremely narrow application of Teague’s watershed 
 
100 Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 665 (2001) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 
311). 
101 Courts frequently interpret the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, to have codified the Teague analysis.  
Whorton, 549 U.S. at 415 n.3.  For a discussion of relevant AEDPA provisions, see supra 
Part I.  Petitions filed under AEDPA make up the vast majority of habeas petitions filed 
today, and only become necessary when the petitioner requests review of a final convic-
tion.  A case becomes final “where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availabil-
ity of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed” before the 
decision for which retroactive application is sought. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 
622 n.5 (1965).  The Teague presumption against retroactivity only exists in the criminal 
context, and more specifically, only applies to cases on collateral review.  The question of 
civil adjudicatory retroactivity remains a murky area and is outside the scope of this 
Comment. 
102 Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 (2004). 
103 For a brief overview of the post-Teague cases that have contemplated retroactivity, see Ezra 
D. Landes, A New Approach To Overcoming the Insurmountable “Watershed Rule” Exception To 
Teague’s Collateral Review Killer, 74 MO. L. REV. 1, 10 n.67 (2009). 
104 See, e.g., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (“Whatever one may think of the im-
portance of respondent’s proposed rule, it has none of the primacy and centrality of the 
rule adopted in Gideon or other rules which may be thought to be within the exception.”); 
Beard, 542 U.S. at 420 (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 485, 495 (1990)); O’Dell v. Nether-
land, 521 U.S. 151, 167 (1997) (citing Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990)); Gray v. 
Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170 (1996) (citing Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495) (all reaffirming Gide-
on’s position as the quintessential watershed rule). 
105 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). 
106 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989). 
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exception.107  Moreover, scholars have identified an inherent conflict 
in the Court’s reasoning in Teague, which has led to much confusion 
among the lower courts when applying Teague’s retroactivity princi-
ples.108  The Teague Court made clear that old rules are retroactive, 
while new rules are not.  Thus, in order for a court to deny retroactiv-
ity under Teague, it must first find that the rule in question is “new” 
because it was not “dictated by precedent existing at the time the de-
fendant’s conviction became final.”109  Nevertheless, at the same time, 
the court must find that the “new” rule does not fall under Teague’s 
watershed exception, because it does not “‘alter our understanding of 
the bedrock procedural elements’ essential to the fairness of a pro-
ceeding.”110  Ezra D. Landes, a California criminal defense attorney, 
has poignantly identified this conflict as follows:  “the Court must es-
chew obviousness to satisfy the need for newness, while at the same 
time acknowledging obviousness to avoid ‘watershedness.’”111  This 
inherent tension rears its ugly head every time the Court considers 
retroactivity under Teague, and yet the Court has repeatedly ignored 
the conflict and struck down every retroactivity claim premised on 
Teague’s watershed exception. 
As soon as the Court decided Padilla in 2010, lower courts were 
inundated with habeas petitions arguing for retroactivity.  The surge 
of habeas petitions has forced lower courts to confront the inherent 
tension in Teague once again, in attempting to determine whether the 
rule announced in Padilla represents a new constitutional rule, and, if 
so, whether Padilla falls under Teague’s watershed exception.  State 
courts and lower federal courts today remain split on this issue.112  To 
 
107 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitu-
tional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1817 (1991) (“Equally troubling is the narrowness 
of the exceptions to Teague’s rule barring consideration of new law claims.”).  See also Bar-
ry Friedman, Pas De Deux:  The Supreme Court and the Habeas Courts, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 
2467, 2496 & n.143 (1993) (stating that “Teague should be overruled,” and that quite 
“[f]rankly, the Court ought to be just a little embarrassed with itself”); David R. Dow, 
Teague and Death:  The Impact of Current Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 23, 50 n.155 (1991) (citing additional articles that criticize 
Teague). 
108 See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (“It is admittedly often difficult to determine when a case an-
nounces a new rule, and we do not attempt to define the spectrum of what may or may 
not constitute a new rule for retroactivity purposes.”). 
109 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
110 Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 665 (2001) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (emphasis omit-
ted)). 
111 Landes, supra note 103, at 16. 
112 E.g., compare United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 634 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that Pa-
dilla did not announce a new rule, and therefore applies retroactively) with Chaidez v. 
United States, 655 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 2011) and United States v. Chang Hong, 671 
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date, no court has found Padilla to apply retroactively under Teague’s 
watershed exception.  However, in light of the significant impact that 
Padilla stands to have on Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, it may be 
time for the courts to finally recognize Padilla as the first case in his-
tory to fall under Teague’s “watershed” exception. 
a.  Old Rule, Retroactive 
It was only a matter of time before the courts encountered a Pa-
dilla claim that satisfied both Strickland prongs and would thus be 
forced to determine the retroactivity of Padilla’s central holding.  The 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the first federal appellate court to 
encounter such a claim, took up the issue in the summer of 2011 in 
United States v. Orocio.113  The Third Circuit’s holding in Orocio laid a 
foundation for understanding Padilla’s rule as one that applies retro-
actively on collateral review. 
Gerald Orocio pled guilty to one count of possession of a con-
trolled substance on October 7, 2004.114  This conviction rendered 
Orocio automatically deportable, and removal proceedings were ini-
tiated against Orocio several years later.115  Orocio then filed a peti-
tion for writ of error coram nobis116 to challenge the plea conviction.  
Orocio argued that his attorney’s failure to advise him of the immi-
gration consequences of pleading guilty to a federal drug charge con-
stituted ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment.117  A New Jersey District Court denied Orocio’s petition, 
and Orocio appealed.  While Orocio’s appeal was still pending, the 
Supreme Court decided Padilla.118  Seizing this opportunity, Orocio 
sought to retroactively avail himself of the rule established in Pa-
dilla.119 
 
F.3d 1147, 1158 (10th Cir. 2011) (both finding that Padilla announced a new rule that 
did not fall under either Teague exception, and that Padilla therefore did not apply retro-
actively). 
113 Orocio, 645 F.3d at 633–34. 
114 Id. at 634. 
115 Id. 
116 Federal courts have the power to vacate a judgment of conviction by granting the ancient 
writ of error coram nobis as a last resort to petitioners who have exhausted or waived any 
statutory right of review, and who thus cannot obtain collateral relief through any alterna-
tive remedy.  This extraordinary remedy is granted “only under circumstances compelling 
such action to achieve justice.”  United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511 (1954). 
117 Orocio, 645 F.3d at 634. 
118 Id. at 633. 
119 Id. at 637. 
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Acknowledging that Orocio had established a prima facie case 
under Strickland, the Orocio court set out to tackle the issue of Padilla’s 
retroactive application to Orocio’s claim.  In order to do so, the court 
recognized that it would need to determine whether Padilla an-
nounced a new rule or merely applied Strickland in a new context.  
Under Teague, an old rule would apply retroactively, while a new rule 
would not, unless it fell under one of Teague’s narrow exceptions.  
The court in Orocio identified three principles that guide the “new 
rule” inquiry: 
(1) “case law need not exist on all fours to allow for a finding under 
Teague that the rule at issue was dictated by . . . precedent,” (2) “Strickland 
is a rule of general applicability which asks whether counsel’s conduct 
was objectively reasonable and conformed to professional norms based 
‘on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s 
conduct,’” and (3) “it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so 
novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent.”120 
The court acknowledged that Padilla was indeed the first Supreme 
Court case to apply Strickland to an attorney’s failure to advise his cli-
ent about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea.121  But alt-
hough no case law existed “on all fours” with Padilla,122 the Orocio 
court nonetheless believed that Strickland included enough breathing 
room to have encompassed Jose Padilla’s claim without creating a 
new rule of criminal procedure.123  In the court’s view, when Jose Pa-
dilla pled guilty, it was “hardly novel” for an attorney to provide ad-
vice to his client at the plea stage concerning the immigration conse-
quences of a guilty plea.124 
The Third Circuit is not alone in holding this position.  District 
Courts sitting in the Ninth Circuit similarly hold that Padilla repre-
sents an “old rule” for Teague purposes and should thus apply retroac-
tively on collateral review.125  The current leading case in the Ninth 
 
120 Id. at 639 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted) (summarizing the effect of Teague and 
Strickland on the inquiry into whether Padilla announced a new rule). 
121 Id. at 637 (“It is true that the precise question of whether the civil removal consequences 
of a plea are within the scope of Strickland had never been addressed by the Supreme 
Court before Padilla.”). 
122 United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 639 (3d Cir. 2011). 
123 Id. at 640–41. 
124 Id. at 639 (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (“For at least the past 
15 years, professional norms have generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide 
advice on the [removal] consequences of a client’s plea.”)). 
125 Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not ruled on this issue, federal district 
courts in the Ninth Circuit almost unanimously apply Padilla retroactively.  For examples 
of the Ninth Circuit’s retroactive application of Padilla, see United States v. Hurtado-Villa, 
Nos. CV-10-01814, CR-08-01249, 2011 WL 4852284, at *6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 12, 2011); Song v. 
United States, Nos. CV 09-5184, CR 98-0806, 2011 WL 2533184, at *2 n.1 (June 27, 2011); 
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Circuit is United States v. Hubenig.126  Andrew Hubenig’s attorney ad-
vised him to plead guilty to a number of offenses committed while he 
was visiting Yosemite National Park.  At the time Hubenig’s attorney 
offered this advice, he was aware that Hubenig was a Canadian citi-
zen, and nonetheless failed to discuss with Hubenig whether a guilty 
plea to the pending charges would affect his immigration status.  On 
his attorney’s advice, Hubenig pled guilty, rendering him automati-
cally deportable.  Hubenig filed for a writ of error coram nobis alleg-
ing a Sixth Amendment violation based on the holding in Padilla. 
Like the court in Orocio, the Hubenig court held that Padilla merely 
reiterated the old Strickland rule in a new context, and would there-
fore apply retroactively to Hubenig’s claim on collateral review.127  As 
justification for this holding, the Hubenig court cited three recent 
Supreme Court opinions applying the Strickland test in a variety of 
different factual contexts:  Rompilla v. Beard,128 Wiggins v. Smith,129 and 
Williams v. Taylor.130  The Hubenig court noted that none of these cases 
have been afforded new rule status under Teague.131  Curiously, how-
ever, each of the cases cited in Hubenig required the Supreme Court 
to review decisions by state courts that were “contrary to, or involved 
an unreasonable application of” the Strickland standard, under 28 
 
United States v. Krboyan, Nos. 1:10-cv-02016, 1:02-cr-05438, 2011 WL 2117023, at *9 (E.D. 
Cal. May 27, 2011). 
126 No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010). 
127 Id. at *8; accord Jiminez v. Holder, No. 10-cv-1528, 2011 WL 3667628, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 
19, 2011); United States v. Reid, No. 1:97-CR-94, 2011 WL 3417235, at *3–4 (S.D. Ohio 
Aug. 4, 2011); Song v. United States, Nos. CV 09-5184, CR 98-0806, 2011 WL 2940316, at 
*2 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2011); United States v. Dass, No. 05-140 (3), 2011 WL 2746181, at 
*4–5 (D. Minn. July 14, 2011); United States v. Krboyan, Nos. 1:02-cr-05438, 1:10-cv-
02016, 2011 WL 2117023, at *9 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2011); United States v. Zhong Lin, No. 
3:07-CR-44, 2011 WL 197206, at *1–2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 20, 2011); Luna v. United States, No. 
10CV1659, 2010 WL 4868062, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2010); Al Kokabani v. United 
States, Nos. 5:06-CR-207-FL, 5:08-CV-177-FL, 2010 WL 3941836, at *6 (E.D.N.C. July 30, 
2010) (district court cases that remain good law within their circuits as of March 2012, 
holding that Padilla did not announce a new rule). 
128 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005) (applying Strickland to defense counsel’s failure to examine the 
court file on defendant’s prior conviction for rape and assault during the sentencing 
phase of a capital murder trial). 
129 539 U.S. 510, 524, 533 (2003) (applying Strickland to counsel’s decision not to expand 
investigation of petitioner’s life history for mitigating evidence beyond presentence inves-
tigation (“PSI”) report and department of social services records). 
130 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000) (applying Strickland to defense attorney’s failure to investigate 
and present substantial mitigating evidence during sentencing phase of capital murder 
trial). 
131 United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 
2010). 
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U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).132  In all of these cases, lower federal courts re-
viewing the state court decisions on habeas review had previously 
identified § 2254(d)(1) as the governing standard for the given set of 
facts.133  These cases are easily distinguishable from Padilla.  Padilla 
came to the United States Supreme Court directly from the Supreme 
Court of Kentucky, without going through the traditional line of ha-
beas review in lower federal courts.  Thus, the Supreme Court in Pa-
dilla never even considered whether the lower court’s decision was 
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of” the Strick-
land standard.  Instead, the Supreme Court, for the first time in histo-
ry, reinterpreted the underlying principles in Strickland to apply in a 
completely new factual context.  Plainly put, Padilla was not was not 
merely a reiteration of the old Strickland standard.  For that reason 
alone Padilla could be considered a “new rule” for Teague purposes. 
Despite this potential flaw, the reasoning in Orocio and Hubenig 
represents a step in the right direction.  Both courts highlighted the 
Supreme Court’s statement in Padilla that it had “given serious con-
sideration” to the argument that its ruling would open the “flood-
gates” to new litigation challenging prior guilty pleas.134  The Orocio 
and Hubenig courts were correct in arguing that the entire “flood-
gates” discussion would have been unnecessary if the Supreme Court 
intended Padilla to be a new rule that would apply only prospective-
ly.135  However, by automatically concluding that Padilla was therefore 
intended to be an “old rule,” these courts ignored the possibility that 
the Supreme Court intended Padilla to be a “new rule” that neverthe-
less applied retroactively through one of the Teague exceptions.  It is 
thus useful to review those cases that have considered the application 
of Teague’s “watershed” exception. 
 
132 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), federal courts hold habeas jurisdiction over individu-
als in state custody when their conviction in state court resulted from a “decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). 
133 An individual in state custody may apply for habeas relief after exhausting his state court 
remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006), if the decision in state court “resulted in a 
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab-
lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(1). 
134 Hubenig, 2010 WL 2650625, at *7; United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 641 (3d Cir. 
2011) (both citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484–85 (2010)). 
135 Hubenig, 2010 WL 2650625, at *7; Orocio, 645 F.3d at 641. 
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b.  New Rule, Not Retroactive 
The Seventh and Tenth Circuits have now affirmatively recog-
nized Padilla as a “new rule” for Teague purposes, and have thus de-
clined to extend retroactive application to Padilla’s Sixth Amendment 
standards pursuant to Teague’s non-retroactivity rule.  In August of 
2011, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered a coram nobis 
petition filed on behalf of Roselva Chaidez, an alien subjected to de-
portation following her conviction for mail fraud.136  Chaidez’s peti-
tion alleged that her trial counsel offered ineffective assistance by fail-
ing to inform her that her guilty plea carried the risk of 
deportation.137  As Chaidez’s conviction became final prior to the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Padilla, Chaidez sought retroactive applica-
tion of the Sixth Amendment standards announced in Padilla.138  Ap-
plying Teague, the Chaidez court held that Padilla announced a new 
rule of criminal procedure that did not apply retroactively on collat-
eral review.139 
In arriving at this conclusion, the court acknowledged that Padilla 
was in fact an extension of Strickland.  However, the court correctly 
noted that this fact does not speak to whether Padilla announced a 
new rule.140  In deciding whether Padilla was a new rule, the court 
considered whether the result in Padilla was dictated by prior prece-
dent at the time that Jose Padilla’s conviction became final.141  The 
court concluded that Padilla’s outcome was “susceptible to reasonable 
debate” at the time that Padilla was decided.142  That the members of 
the Padilla Court expressed such an “array of views” indicated to the 
Chaidez court that Padilla was not, in fact, dictated by precedent.  In 
the Chaidez court’s view, the Padilla concurrence left no doubt that 
Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts considered the case to be 
ground-breaking.143  This sentiment of the concurrence, coupled with 
 
136 Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 686 (7th Cir. 2011). 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 688. 
139 Id. at 694. 
140 Id. at 692 (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990) (“[T]he fact that a court 
says that its decision is within the ‘logical compass’ of an earlier decision, or indeed that it 
is ‘controlled’ by a prior decision, is not conclusive for purposes of deciding whether the 
current decision is a ‘new rule’ under Teague.”)). 
141 Id. at 691–92. 
142 Id. at 689, 694. 
143 Id. at 689 (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1488, 1491, 1492 (2010) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (referring to the majority’s holding as a “dramatic departure from prece-
dent,” “a major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law,” and a “dramatic expansion of the 
scope of criminal defense counsel’s duties under the Sixth Amendment”)). 
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the fact that two Justices issued a dissenting opinion chiding the ma-
jority for breaking with precedent, convinced the Chaidez court that 
Padilla announced a “new rule” that was not dictated by prior prece-
dent.144 
In April of this year, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiora-
ri to the parties in Chaidez.  The Court’s decision this fall will settle 
once and for all whether Padilla created a “new rule” that is subject to 
further Teague analysis.  However, because both parties in Chaidez 
have stipulated that if Padilla announced a new rule, neither of 
Teague’s exceptions to non-retroactivity would apply,145 the Supreme 
Court is not likely to weigh in on Padilla’s qualification under 
Teague’s watershed exception. 
To date, at least three circuit courts of appeals have considered 
the application of the second Teague exception to Padilla’s ruling.  In 
August of 2011, the Tenth Circuit became the first Court of Appeals 
to weigh in on the new circuit split in United States v. Chang Hong.146  
In September of 2010, several months after the Supreme Court de-
cided Padilla, Chang Hong filed a motion to set aside his guilty plea, 
alleging that his counsel offered ineffective assistance by failing to in-
form him that pleading guilty to his offense would subject him to au-
tomatic deportation.  Noting that the Supreme Court had never ap-
plied Strickland to the collateral consequences of conviction, the 
Chang Hong court followed Chaidez’s lead and concluded that Padilla 
announced a new rule that was not dictated by prior precedent.147 
The court’s reasoning behind this part of the conclusion is per-
suasive, and has found support among many lower courts, as well as 
from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals this past May.148  However, the 
 
144 Id. at 689–90. 
145 Id. at 688.  See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 7. 
146 671 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2011). 
147 Id. at 1155. 
148 See United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211, 212–13 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e join the Seventh 
and Tenth Circuits in holding that Padilla announced a ‘new’ rule within the meaning of 
Teague.”). See also Ufele v. United States, 825 F. Supp. 2d 193, 197 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 2011); 
United States v. Garcia, Nos. 2:88-cr-31-FtM-29DNF, 2:89-cr-32-FtM-29, 2011 WL 5024628, 
at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2011); Sarria v. United States, No. 11-20730-CIV, 2011 WL 
4949724, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2011); United States v. Abraham, No. 8:09CR126, 2011 
WL 3882290, at *2–3 (D. Neb. Sept. 1, 2011); Zoa v. United States, Civ. No. 10-2823, Cr. 
No. 06-235, 2011 WL 3417116, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 1, 2011); United States v. Chapa, 800 F. 
Supp. 2d 1216, 1221–22 (N.D. Ga. July 12, 2011); Llanes v. United States, No. 8:11-cv-682-
T-23TBM, 2011 WL 2473233, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 22, 2011); Ellis v. United States, 806 F. 
Supp. 2d 538, 548 (E.D.N.Y. June 3, 2011); Dennis v. United States, 787 F. Supp. 2d 425, 
429 (D.S.C. Apr. 19, 2011); Mendoza v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 2d 791, 797 (E.D. Va. 
Mar. 24, 2011); Doan v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 2d 602, 605 (E.D. Va. Jan. 4, 2011); 
United States v. Hough, No. 2:02-cr-00649-1, 2010 WL 5250996, at *3–4 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 
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deductions that followed from this conclusion are less compelling.  
Because the parties in Chang Hong had not filed any stipulations, the 
court next took it upon itself to determine whether Padilla fell under 
Teague’s “watershed” exception.149  The court identified Gideon as the 
paradigmatic example of a case that fit this exception.  But when 
called upon to determine whether Padilla similarly fit the exception, 
the only answer the court could give was, “Padilla is not Gideon.”150 
As support for its “Padilla is not Gideon” stance, the Chang Hong 
court stated: 
[Padilla] does not affect the determination of a defendant’s 
guilt . . . . Padilla would only be at issue in cases where the defendant ad-
mits guilt and pleads guilty.  In such situations, because the defendant’s 
guilt is established through his own admission . . . Padilla is simply not 
germane to concerns about risks of inaccurate convictions or fundamen-
tal procedural fairness.151 
This same unsubstantiated argument was again advanced several 
months later by the Eleventh Circuit in Figuereo-Sanchez v. United 
States.152  In Figuereo-Sanchez, the Eleventh Circuit assumed, for argu-
ment’s sake, that Padilla announced a new rule,153 but refused to ap-
ply the rule retroactively because it concluded that Padilla did not fall 
under the second Teague exception.154  Although the court acknowl-
edged that “a guilty plea as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel 
may result in an inaccurate conviction,”155 it refused to accept that 
“ineffective assistance of counsel . . . is on par with deprivation of 
counsel under Gideon in terms of its presumed effect on the accuracy 
of the proceedings.”156 
The “Padilla is not Gideon” argument arose most recently in the 
Fourth Circuit’s decision denying Padilla’s retroactive effect in United 
 
2010); United States v. Perez, No. 8:02CR296, 2010 WL 4643033, at *2 (D. Neb. Nov. 9, 
2010); United States v. Gilbert, No. 2:03-cr-00349-1, 2010 WL 4134286, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 
19, 2010) (district court cases that remain good law within their respective circuits as of 
March 2012, holding that Padilla announced a new rule). 
149 United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2011).  Because Padilla’s 
rule is procedural and not substantive, the Court did not consider the first Teague excep-
tion.  Id. at 1157. 
150 Id. at 1158. 
151 Id. 
152 678 F.3d 1203 (2012), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3092 (U.S. July 27, 2012) (No. 12-
164). 
153 Id. at 1208. 
154 Id. at 1208–09. 
155 Id. at 1209. 
156 Id. 
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States v. Mathur.157  As compared to Gideon, the Mathur court found 
that Padilla was “much more limited in scope” and had a “far less di-
rect and profound” relationship with the “accuracy of the factfinding 
process.”158  The Fourth Circuit noted that Padilla violations only oc-
cur once a defendant has pled guilty and submitted himself to sen-
tencing.  In the court’s view, “[w]hen such a defendant is surprised at 
a later date by the initiation of deportation proceedings that were not 
forecast by defense counsel, the injustice, while real, nevertheless 
does not cast doubt on the verity of the defendant’s admission of 
guilt.”159 
This position ignores the many petitioners’ arguments that they 
pled guilty not because they admitted guilt, but because their attor-
neys advised them to accept a plea deal to avoid harsher consequenc-
es that could potentially arise out of a wrongful conviction for a 
greater charged offense.  If petitioners knew that a guilty plea could 
lead to deportation, then they might choose to accept the risk of 
wrongful conviction if, in doing so, they could potentially avoid re-
moval.  In such situations, Padilla would certainly be “germane to 
concerns about risks of inaccurate convictions.”160 
The “Padilla is not Gideon” argument can also be seen in a number 
of lower court decisions considering whether Padilla fits Teague’s wa-
tershed exception,161  and to date, no court has truly provided an ad-
equate analysis of the possibility.  However, the Supreme Court may 
have the opportunity to weigh in on the possibility this fall when it 
rules in Chaidez.162  Indeed, amicus briefs filed with the Supreme 
Court in Chaidez’s case indicate that many, if not most, immigrants, 
when properly advised by counsel, would choose to go to trial before 
 
157 685 F.3d 396, 399 (2012), petition for cert. filed, 2012 WL 4842975 (U.S. Oct. 9, 2012) (No. 
12-439). 
158 Id. (quoting Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007)). 
159 Id. at 400. 
160 See United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1158 (10th Cir. 2011). 
161 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, No. 1:10-CV-23718, 2011 WL 3419614, at *7 (S.D. Fla. 
Aug. 4, 2011); Doan v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 2d 602, 606 (E.D. Va. 2011) (“‘Howev-
er laudable’ a rule requiring that noncitizen defendants be informed of the immigration 
consequences of plea bargains might be, such a rule ‘has none of the primacy and cen-
trality of the rule adopted in Gideon.’” (quoting Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 420 
(2004))). 
162 The parties in Figuereo-Sanchez and in Mathur have also recently filed petitions for certio-
rari, which the Court will likely consider sometime after it hears oral arguments in 
Chaidez.  It is likely that the court will defer action on these petitions until after it has de-
cided Chaidez, since Chaidez will likely be dispositive on the issue of Padilla’s retroactivity.  
However, it is possible that the Court’s ruling in Chaidez might fail to answer the ques-
tion of whether Padilla falls under the second Teague exception.  If that were the case, 
these pending petitions for certiorari might become more appealing to the Court. 
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a jury rather than face the automatic immigration consequences of a 
guilty plea.163  In light of this argument, the Supreme Court might 
choose to acknowledge that Padilla’s ruling truly affects the accuracy 
of criminal convictions. 
2.  Identifying the Tension in Determining Padilla’s Retroactivity 
To date, no federal or state court has extended retroactive treat-
ment to Padilla under the second Teague exception reserved for “wa-
tershed rules of criminal procedure.”  However, a number of courts 
have danced around the issue, and at the very least, have left room to 
argue for this possibility.  Consider, for example, the opinion issued 
in Santos-Sanchez v. United States.164  Jesus Natividad Santos-Sanchez was 
charged with aiding and abetting the illegal entry of a Mexican alien.  
Santos-Sanchez pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 
probation.  Because Santos-Sanchez was a resident alien at the time of 
his plea, the resulting conviction rendered Santos-Sanchez automati-
cally deportable upon completion of his probation.  Santos-Sanchez 
filed a writ of error coram nobis, alleging that his attorney had of-
fered ineffective assistance when he failed to inform him about the 
immigration consequences of his guilty plea.165  Santos-Sanchez’s peti-
tion made it all the way up to the United States Supreme Court, but 
during the pendency of Santos-Sanchez’s petition, the Supreme 
Court decided Padilla.  Santos-Sanchez’s case was thus remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with Padilla,166 perhaps signaling to the 
lower court the potential for retroactive application of Padilla’s rul-
ing.167 
On remand, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas 
attempted to determine whether Padilla applies retroactively, and de-
 
163 See Brief of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, National Immigration Pro-
ject of the National Lawyers Guild, Immigrant Legal Resource Center and Immigrant De-
fense Project as Amici Curiae Supporting of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 19, 
at 10 (noting that the immigration consequences of a conviction are often the greatest 
priority to immigrant clients). 
164 No. 5:06-cv-153, 2011 WL 3793691 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2011). 
165 Id. at *1. 
166 Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2340 (2010). 
167 The Supreme Court’s decision to remand Santos-Sanchez, rather than to take the oppor-
tunity to rule on the retroactivity of Padilla through the Santos-Sanchez vehicle, could be 
interpreted to imply Padilla’s retroactive effect.  See, e.g. Danielle M. Lang, Comment, Pa-
dilla v. Kentucky:  The Effect Of Plea Colloquy Warnings On Defendants’ Ability To Bring Success-
ful Padilla Claims, 121 YALE L.J. 944, 971–72 (2012) (arguing that Padilla should apply ret-
roactively, but only because Padilla was not a “new rule” for Teague purposes).  Although 
not dispositive on the issue, the Court’s decision to remand may have served as an implic-
it starting point for the Santos-Sanchez court’s retroactivity analysis on remand. 
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cided outright that it must apply retroactively, because, in the court’s 
view, Padilla itself came to the Supreme Court on collateral review, 
and it “both announced and applied its own rule.”168  The court ap-
plied Teague and concluded that, had the rule not been intended to 
apply retroactively, it would not have applied to the petitioner in Pa-
dilla, but would only apply to subsequent defendants bringing Padilla 
claims.169  The court then worked backwards to determine which of 
three scenarios applied to Padilla:  “(1) Padilla announced an old 
rule; (2) Padilla announced a new rule and the first Teague exception 
applies; or (3) Padilla announced a new rule and the second Teague 
exception applies.”  All three scenarios—and only these three scenar-
ios—would lead to retroactivity.170 
The court ultimately discarded all three scenarios.  Like the 
Chaidez and Chang Hong courts, the Santos-Sanchez court determined 
that Padilla did not reiterate an old rule, because reasonable jurists 
could have disagreed about the requirements of the Sixth Amend-
ment prior to Padilla.171  The court likewise dismissed the second sce-
nario, because Padilla announced a procedural rather than a substan-
tive rule, and thus did not fall under the first Teague exception.172  
Finally, in a total of five sentences, the court dismissed the possibility 
that Padilla fell under the second Teague exception, offering the same 
“Padilla is not Gideon” argument advanced by the Chang Hong court.173 
Thoroughly confounded, the court ultimately abandoned its 
quest, and concluded that “Padilla’s holding could not be readily rec-
onciled with the Teague framework.”174  Nevertheless, because all 
roads would lead to retroactivity, and would thus require the court to 
 
168 Santos-Sanchez, No. 5:06-cv-153, 2011 WL 3793691, at *3 & *10 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2011).  
The Court discussed Graham v. Collins, in which the Supreme Court made it clear that 
when a case is on collateral review and the holding sought by the defendant would an-
nounce a new rule that does not fit a Teague exception, the Court will refuse to apply or 
announce the rule in that case.  506 U.S. 461, 463, 477–78 (1993). 
169 Santos-Sanchez, No. 5:06-cv-153, 2011 WL 3793691 at *10.  As is discussed below, this prem-
ise is flawed.  The Supreme Court took Padilla’s case on direct review of the state’s collateral 
proceedings—not on collateral review of a state court decision. Under Danforth v. Minnesota, 
128 S.Ct. 1029, 1038 (2008), Teague’s retroactivity doctrine does not bind state courts in 
state collateral proceedings.  Therefore, Teague would not have applied during the Su-
preme Court’s direct review of Kentucky’s collateral proceedings. 
170 Santos-Sanchez, 2011 WL 3793691 at *3. 
171 Id. at *6–9. 
172 Id. at *9–10. 
173 Id. at *10 (“[T]he Supreme Court has pointed to Gideon v. Wainwright, as the prototypical 
example of a decision that implicates the second Teague exception. . . . In light of this in-
credibly high threshold, it seems improper to consider Padilla holding (sic) to be a ‘wa-
tershed rule of criminal procedure.’”). 
174 Id. 
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reach the merits of the petitioner’s claims, the court found it unnec-
essary to choose among the three unsatisfactory scenarios.175 
The opinion in Santos-Sanchez may not stand as the most pristine 
specimen of legal analysis, and there are certainly flaws in the path 
taken by the Santos-Sanchez court.  To begin with, the court seems to 
have muddled the procedural posture of Padilla itself.  Although the 
court in Santos-Sanchez indicated that Padilla was before the Supreme 
Court on “collateral review,” the court failed to take note of the fact 
that the Supreme Court took Padilla’s case on direct review of the 
state’s collateral proceedings—not on collateral review of a state court 
decision.  This is an important distinction, because under existing 
Supreme Court precedent, Teague’s retroactivity doctrine does not 
bind state courts in state collateral proceedings.176  Thus, the fact that 
the Supreme Court “both announced and applied its own rule”177 in 
Padilla does not necessarily indicate that the Padilla ruling was in-
tended to apply retroactively on federal habeas to cases that became 
final on direct review prior to the Padilla decision. 
However, if one were to assume, for argument’s sake, the accuracy 
of the Santos-Sanchez court’s initial premise—that Padilla was intended 
to announce a retroactive rule because the Supreme Court applied 
that rule to the Padilla petitioner himself—the logical reasoning that 
followed from that premise is sound.  By working backwards, the San-
tos-Sanchez court seems to have identified the underlying tension cre-
ated by retroactivity analysis with respect to Padilla.  The court implic-
itly recognized both that Padilla announced a new rule, and that it 
was intended to apply retroactively.  The court scarcely addressed the 
possibility that Teague’s watershed exception would apply to Padilla, 
which is unsurprising given courts’ unrelenting reluctance to apply 
the exception. 
In a footnote, the Santos-Sanchez court “speculate[d] whether Pa-
dilla marked the announcement of a third ‘new rule’ exception un-
der Teague that applies exclusively to Padilla’s holding because” of the 
unique nature of deportation.178  Although it is possible that Padilla 
created a new exception, such a construct seems unnecessary, given 
the possibility that Padilla fits into the existent Teague framework.  
Nevertheless, the court seems to be on to something by recognizing 
 
175 Id. 
176 See Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1038 (2008) (holding that Teague did not “ex-
plicitly or implicitly constrain[] the authority of the States to provide remedies for a 
broader range of constitutional violations than are redressable on federal habeas”). 
177 Santos-Sanchez, No. 5:06-cv-153, 2011 WL 3793691 at *10. 
178 Id. at *10 n.99. 
698 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:2 
 
that Padilla should be an exception to Teague’s general presumption 
against retroactivity.  It seems that Teague’s watershed exception 
would resolve the paradox identified in Santos-Sanchez—a paradox 
that has seemed to plague jurists and scholars alike in the debate over 
Padilla’s retroactivity.179 
IV.  AN ARGUMENT FOR PADILLA AS A TRULY “WATERSHED” RULING 
Despite many courts’ arguments to the contrary, Padilla seems to 
have created a “new” constitutional norm that has marked a “major 
upheaval in Sixth Amendment law.”180  Prior to 2010, federal courts 
adhered to the belief that deportation was a purely civil matter, and 
as such, could at best be considered a collateral consequence of con-
viction.  Padilla overcame this formalistic distinction by noting that 
the “landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically 
over the last 90 years.”181  In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens 
sought a middle ground, noting that deportation resulting from a 
criminal conviction is now, “because of its close connection to the 
criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a 
collateral consequence.”182  Due to the changes in federal immigra-
tion law, the Supreme Court recognized the need to institute a 
change in its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and in doing so, the 
Court broke new ground in abandoning the divide between criminal 
and civil labels in the deportation context.183  In fact, the Court im-
 
179 Dan Kesselbrenner, writing for the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers 
Guild, briefly advanced this argument in an advisory to practitioners regarding the im-
pact of Padilla on habeas claims.  Kesselbrenner argues that Padilla did not announce a 
new rule of criminal procedure and should thus apply retroactively on habeas review.  
However, he argues in the alternative that if Padilla is seen to announce a new rule, prac-
titioners should argue that the rule is “watershed” in nature, and subject to the second 
Teague exception.  Dan Kesselbrenner, Nat’l Immigration Project of the Nat’l Lawyers 
Guild, A Defending Immigrants Partnership Practice Advisory:  Retroactive Applicability of Padilla 
v. Kentucky, 2–5 (2011), available at  www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legal             
resources/practice_advisories/padilla%20retro%20revised%203-2011.pdf.  Kesselbrenner 
does, however, admit that this argument may be difficult to make in light of the fact that 
other “landmark” decisions like Crawford v. Washington have not been identified as quali-
fying for “watershed” status. 
180 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1491 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring). 
181 Id. at 1478. 
182 Id. at 1482. 
183 Many scholars have likewise recognized the fact that Padilla “broke new ground” in Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  For example, in a UCLA Law Review article, Professor Dan-
iel Kanstroom referred to Padilla as a “pathbreaking decision” that created a “new consti-
tutional norm.”  Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky:  
The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1463, 
1472 (2011).  See also Margaret Love & Gabriel J. Chin, The “Major Upheaval” of Padilla v. 
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plicitly recognized the novelty of its position when it acknowledged 
that its holding would recognize new grounds for attacking the validi-
ty of a guilty plea.184  Although the Supreme Court had never applied 
the collateral versus direct distinction to define the scope of reasona-
bly effective assistance of counsel, the result in Padilla certainly was 
not dictated by prior lower court precedent,185 and at the time Padilla 
was decided, its result was certainly in dispute even among members 
of the nation’s highest court.186  In light of the Court’s precedent at 
the time Padilla arrived on its docket, it seems relatively clear that Pa-
dilla did, in fact, announce a new rule of criminal procedure. 
So what, then, is left of the retroactivity question?  As outlined 
above, many courts have ruled that Padilla cannot apply retroactively 
in light of the conclusion that Padilla announced a new rule.187  How-
ever, these premises entirely ignore the possibility that Padilla falls 
under Teague’s rare watershed exception. 
Although courts have repeatedly underscored the extreme rarity 
with which Teague’s watershed exception would apply, Padilla is the 
ideal candidate for “watershed” status, if ever one were to exist.188  As 
 
Kentucky:  Extending the Right to Counsel to the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, 25 CRIM. 
JUST. 36, 37 (2010) (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court broke new ground in holding that a 
criminal defense lawyer had failed to provide his noncitizen client competent representa-
tion as required by the Sixth Amendment when he did not warn him that he was almost 
certain to be deported if he pled guilty.”). 
184 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (“Likewise, although we must be especially careful about recog-
nizing new grounds for attacking the validity of guilty pleas, in the 25 years since we first 
applied Strickland to claims of ineffective assistance at the plea stage, practice has shown 
that pleas are less frequently the subject of collateral challenges than convictions ob-
tained after a trial.” (emphasis added)). 
185 See Chin & Holmes, supra note 36, at 697, 699 (noting that “virtually all jurisdictions”—
including “eleven federal circuits, more than thirty states, and the District of Columbia”—
“hold that defense counsel need not discuss with their clients the collateral consequences 
of a conviction,” including deportation). 
186 As was noted by the Chaidez court, the fact “[t]hat the members of the Padilla Court ex-
pressed such an ‘array of views’” suggests “that Padilla was not dictated by precedent.”  
Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2011). 
187 See, e.g., United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1150, 1156–57 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(“Padilla does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review”); Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 
686 (reversing the District Court decision applying Padilla retroactively). 
188 Indeed, many legal scholars have referred to Padilla as a “watershed” decision, without 
regard to its retroactivity.  See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 20, at 1118 (remarking that the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Padilla marked a “watershed in the Court’s approach to regu-
lating plea” proceedings); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 1299, 1299, 1332 (2011) (stating that Padilla may “mark[] the beginning of a signifi-
cant reconceptualization of the nature of deportation,” representing a “critical pivot 
point” in the Court’s right to counsel jurisprudence); Duncan Fulton, Comment, Emer-
gence of a Deportation Gideon?:  The Impact of Padilla v. Kentucky on Right to Counsel Jurispru-
dence, 86 TUL. L. REV. 219, 244 (2011) (arguing that Padilla represents a “watershed mo-
ment in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence”). 
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the parties in Chaidez have argued to the Supreme Court, the ques-
tion decided in Padilla is one of “exceptional importance” which 
“go[es] to the core of the legitimacy of criminal convictions.”189  This 
is because, as Justice Stevens noted in the Padilla majority, in light of 
changes to current immigration laws, which now make deportation 
virtually inevitable in a large number of cases, “accurate legal advice 
for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important.”190  
Indeed, the majority based its opinion on the fact that “deportation is 
an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the 
penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead 
guilty to specified crimes.”191  If armed with the knowledge that a con-
viction is almost certain to land a defendant in immigration court, a 
defendant may very well choose to risk going to trial rather than ac-
cept a plea deal offering a reduced sentence.  True, many of the 
noncitizen defendants who have accepted plea deals have done so 
with full knowledge of their own guilt.  However, it is also possible 
that many innocent individuals have accepted guilty pleas simply be-
cause the risk and inconvenience of going to trial were much greater 
than the consequences resulting from the given plea deal.  Simply 
put, information about the deportation consequences of one’s ac-
tions may be the most powerful tool available to noncitizens when in-
teracting with the criminal justice system.  By depriving a noncitizen 
defendant of this powerful tool, the system denies him a constitution-
al right that stands to have a profound impact on the “fundamental 
fairness” of the criminal proceedings against him. 
It is thus clear that Padilla’s rule will have a significant impact on 
criminal procedure in the immigration context going forward.  How-
ever, the question remains whether Padilla is sufficiently important to 
rise to the level of a “watershed rule of criminal procedure” that war-
rants retroactivity under Teague.  Although courts have yet to extend 
this exception to a single case arising on collateral review, federal and 
state courts exalt the rule announced in Gideon v. Wainwright192 as one 
that is deserving of the “watershed” title.  In Gideon, the Supreme 
Court pronounced that the Sixth Amendment requires that indigent 
criminal defendants in all state and federal felony cases be afforded 
legal representation.193  In the majority opinion, Justice Black high-
lighted that “[r]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in 
 
189 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 16. 
190 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010). 
191 Id. 
192 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
193 Id. at 343–45. 
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our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, 
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless 
counsel is provided for him.  This seems to us to be an obvious 
truth.”194 
It is unsurprising that Gideon has been viewed as marking a water-
shed moment in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and that its magni-
tude has remained unrivaled in the eyes of the Court for decades.  
However, it now seems that Gideon may finally have met its match.  
Mere weeks after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Padilla, 
immigrants’ rights advocates were referring to Padilla as a “‘Gideon 
Decision’ for Immigrants,”195 and academics alluded to Padilla becom-
ing a “deportation Gideon” that could one day come to guarantee the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in deportation proceedings.196  
One scholar has noted that, in light of Padilla, “[i]t now seems a ra-
ther striking irony and possibly a constitutional problem that a crimi-
nal defendant has a constitutional right to counsel who can explain 
and advise as to at least some possible deportation consequences, 
while a person arrested for being simply out of status has no such 
right.”197  It seems reasonably plausible that in the next several years, 
the Supreme Court will announce that its holding in Padilla was in-
tended to resolve that inconsistency. 
The language in Padilla supports the notion that fundamental 
fairness norms in deportation hearings have significantly expanded 
over the years, and that the “bedrock procedural elements” recog-
nized in Gideon should have at least some hold for noncitizens facing 
deportation proceedings, whether or not the noncitizen is subject to 
deportation due to a criminal conviction.  The Court in Padilla 
deemed deportation to be the “equivalent of banishment or exile”198 
and acknowledged that a noncitizen’s sense of security in this country 
may be one of his most valued intangible possessions.199  Given the 
drastic effects that deportation may have on a noncitizen’s sense of 
 
194 Id. at 344. 
195 See, e.g., Maria Teresa Rojas, A “Gideon Decision” for Immigrants, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND. BLOG 
(Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.soros.org/voices/gideon-decision-immigrants (suggesting 
that Padilla “completely change[d] the landscape for immigrants facing criminal charg-
es”). 
196 See Fulton, supra note 188, at 244. 
197 Daniel Kanstroom, Padilla v. Kentucky and the Evolving Right to Deportation Counsel:  Water-
shed or Work-in-Progress?, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 305, 319 (2011). 
198 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (citing Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 
U.S. 388, 390–91 (1947)). 
199 See, e.g., Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480 (“[D]eportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes 
the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who 
plead guilty to specified crimes.” (emphasis added)). 
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security—arguably tantamount to a “basic human need[]”200—it is 
conceivable that the Court intended to extend the Sixth Amendment 
standard announced in Padilla not only to strictly criminal proceed-
ings, but also to deportation proceedings themselves, which now fall 
somewhere in between the civil and criminal realms.201 
Padilla carries even greater importance if one interprets the deci-
sion to have extended Gideon to all deportation proceedings.  Statis-
tics show that representation by counsel may be the single most im-
portant factor in predicting success on a noncitizen’s application for 
relief during removal proceedings.  From fiscal year 2006 through 
2010, less than half of the noncitizens whose removal proceedings 
were completed were represented by legal counsel.202  In 2007, a rep-
resentative year, represented detainees in defensive asylum cases re-
ceived relief in 27% of their cases, while only 8% of those without 
representation were successful.203  In 2009, only 3% of detained, un-
represented asylum-seekers were granted relief, although as many as 
39% of immigrant detainees had potentially meritorious claims.204  In 
light of these statistics, it is easy to construe the rights recognized in 
Padilla as rights that are necessary to prevent an impermissibly large 
risk of inaccuracy in the deportation process—a prerequisite for wa-
tershed status. 
The overlap between Padilla and Gideon is undeniable.  As Marga-
ret Love and Gabriel Chin argued in an article in Criminal Justice, “Pa-
dilla may turn out to be the most important right to counsel case 
since Gideon.”205  It may, thus, be time for courts to put to rest the “Pa-
 
200 In 2006, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) unanimously endorsed the establishment 
of the right to counsel in civil proceedings where “basic human needs” are at stake.  ABA 
House of Delegates Res. 112A (Aug. 7, 2006), reprinted in Justice Howard H. Dana, Jr., 
ABA 2006 Resolution on Civil Right to Counsel, 2006 EDWARD V. SPARER SYMPOSIUM:  CIVIL 
GIDEON:  CREATING A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THE CIVIL CONTEXT, 15 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 501, 507, 508 (2006).  Not all states have adopted such a 
position, and the Supreme Court has not explicitly embraced this view.  Nevertheless, the 
ABA resolution suggests a trend toward an expanded perception of the Sixth Amend-
ment that is not a far cry from the view espoused in Padilla. 
201 See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (stating that deportation “is not, in a strict sense, a criminal 
sanction.  Although removal proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is nevertheless 
intimately related to the criminal process” (internal citation omitted)). 
202 EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2010 STATISTICAL YEAR 
BOOK G1 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/syb2000main.htm. 
203 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-940, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM:  SIGNIFICANT 
VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND JUDGES 30 
(2008). 
204 See Kanstroom, supra note 183, at 1511–12 (citing statistics reported by the Constitution 
Project and the New York City Bar Justice Center). 
205 Love & Chin, supra note 183, at 37. 
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dilla is not Gideon” argument, and to finally recognize Padilla as the 
first case in history to fall under Teague’s “watershed” exception.  
There are, of course, limitations that habeas petitioners will face even 
if Padilla is applied retroactively.  For example, a large part of the 
problem facing immigrants is not their counsel’s inadequacy, but the 
substantive immigration law itself.  So while Padilla may have marked 
a “watershed” moment for noncitizens facing deportation, there will 
still be many institutional hurdles to overcome before Padilla’s retro-
activity can take full effect.206  Further, given the statute of limitations 
that applies to habeas claims,207 a number of petitioners may be pro-
cedurally barred from applying for habeas relief even after a deter-
mination on the issue of retroactivity.  Nonetheless, because of the 
continuing availability of extraordinary relief,208 Padilla’s retroactivity 
remains a hot topic, as the Supreme Court made clear when it grant-
ed certiorari in Chaidez this spring.  And although the Court’s deci-
sion in Chaidez may not address the application of Teague’s excep-
tions, it is possible that the High Court may one day take it upon itself 
to consider Padilla’s “watershed” status. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There is little doubt that the rule announced in Padilla has had a 
profound impact on Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in the “crim-
migration”209 context going forward.  Padilla has ensured that nonciti-
zen defendants will receive information regarding the immigration 
consequences of their tactical decisions, and may even one day guar-
antee noncitizens the right to counsel in non-criminal deportation 
proceedings.  The magnitude of Padilla’s holding can be seen in the 
sheer number of noncitizens who have sought to benefit from its rule 
in the past two years.  It is true that as AEDPA’s one-year statute of 
limitations gradually tolls, the number of detainees who may have vi-
 
206 See Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1402–03 
(2011) (arguing that the content of the substantive criminal law creates just as many 
problems for noncitizen defendants as does defense counsel’s inadequacy). 
207 If the Supreme Court recognizes a new constitutional right and permits lower courts to 
apply the new right retroactively, § 2255 grants habeas petitioners one year to apply for 
habeas relief based on the new constitutional standard.  28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (Supp. I 
2008). 
208 After the statute of limitations under § 2255 has run out, the federally convicted nonciti-
zen may still have a coram nobis remedy under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, the All Writs Act.  Unit-
ed States v. Denedo, 129 S. Ct. 2213, 2218–19, 2221–24 (2009). 
209 “Crimmigration” is a term used to define the intersection of criminal and immigration 
law.  See Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing Time:  Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L. 
REV. 1705, 1708 (2011). 
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able Padilla claims will begin to wane.  Nonetheless, acknowledging 
Padilla as a new watershed constitutional rule is an important logical 
and symbolic step in expanding right-to-counsel jurisprudence in the 
immigration arena.  The landmark decision in Padilla thus stands to 
have an even greater impact if it is recognized to have overcome the 
seemingly insurmountable “watershed” exception to Teague’s general 
presumption against retroactivity.  Indeed, if Padilla does not satisfy 
this exception, it is difficult to conceive of a rule that ever would. 
 
